First published in 2000. This is Volume V of six in the International Library of Philosophy looking at the area of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Anglo-American Philosophy. Written in 1922, it focuses on Philosophical studies and a selection of papers and lectures.

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an External World In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein.

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best.
The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are:
* A Defense of Common Sense
* Certainty
* Sense-Data
* External and Internal Relations
* Hume's Theory Explained
* Is Existence a Predicate?
* Proof of an External World
In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein.

First published in 2000. This is Volume V of six in the International Library of Philosophy looking at the area of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Anglo-American Philosophy. Written in 1922, it focuses on Philosophical studies and a selection of papers and lectures.

Principia Ethica is recognized as the definitive starting point for twentieth-century ethical theory. The text is reprinted here with the previously unpublished preface Moore wrote for a planned, but never completed, second edition. Though unfinished, it sets out clearly Moore's second thoughts about his own work. The volume also includes two important pieces from his later ethical writings, "Free Will" and "The Conception of Intrinsic Value," and a new introduction by Thomas Baldwin.

This scarce antiquarian book is a selection from Kessinger Publishing's Legacy Reprint Series. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment to protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature. Kessinger Publishing is the place to find hundreds of thousands of rare and hard-to-find books with something of interest for everyone!

This scarce antiquarian book is a selection from Kessinger PublishingAcentsa -a centss Legacy Reprint Series. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment to protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature. Kessinger Publishing is the place to find hundreds of thousands of rare and hard-to-find books with something of interest for e

ETHICS G. E. MOORE Lrrr. D., LL. D., F. B. A. HUMPHREY MILFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO First published in 1912 and reprinted in 1925 twice, 1927, 1928, 1930, 1936, 1939, 1944 and 1945 PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN CONTENTS OTAf. FA6P I UTILITARIANISM 7 U UTILITARIANISM concluded .... 40 ill THE OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS . 79 IV THH OBJECTIVITY oir MORAL JUDGMENTS concluded 138 V RESULTS THE TEST OF RIGHT AND WRONG . 170 VI FREE WILL 196 VII INTRINSIC VALUB .... 228 NOTE ON BOOKS 258 INDEX 266 ETHICS CHAPTER I UTILITARIANISM ETHICS is a subject about which there has been and still is an immense amount of difference of opinion, in spite of all the time and labour which have been devoted to the study of it. There are indeed certain matters about which there is not much disagree ment. Almost everybody is agreed that certain kinds of actions ought, as a general rule, to be avoided and that under certain circumstances, which constantly recur, it is, as a general rule, better to act in certain specified ways rather than in others. There is, moreover, a pretty general agreement, with regard to certain things which happen in the world, that it would be better if they never happened, or, at least, did not happen 8 ETHICS so often as they do and with regard to others, that it would be better if they hap pened more often than they do. But on many questions, even of this kind, there is great diversity of opinion. Actions which some philosophers hold to be generally wrong, others hold to be generally right, and occurrences which some hold to be evils, others hold to be goods. And when we come to more fundamental questions the difference of opinion is even more marked. Ethicalphilosophers have, in fact, been largely concerned, not with laying down rules to the effect that certain ways of acting are generally or always right, and others generally or always wrong, nor yet with giving lists of things which are good and others which are evil, but with trying to answer more general and fundamental questions such as the following. What, after all, is it that we mean to say of an action when we say that it is right or ought to be done And what is it that we mean to say of a state of things when we say that it is good or bad Can we discover any general characteristic, which belongs in UTILITARIANISM common to absolutely all right actions, no matter how different they may be in other respects and which does not belong to any actions except those which are right And can we similarly discover any char acteristic which belongs in common to absolutely all good things, and which does not belong to any thing except what is a good Or again, can we discover any single reason, applicable to all right actions equally, which is, in every case, the reason why an action is right, when it is right And can we, similarly, discover any reason which is the reason why a thing is good, when it is good, and which also gives us the reason why any one thing is better than another, when it is better Or is there, perhaps, no such single reason in either case On questions of this sort different philo sophers still hold the most diverse opinions. I think it is true that absolutely every answer which has ever been given to them by any one philosopher would be denied to be true by many others. There is, at any rate, no such consensus of opinion among experts about these fundamental ethical 10ETHICS questions, as there is about many funda mental propositions in Mathematics and the Natural Sciences. Now, it is precisely questions of this sort, about every one of which there are serious differences of opinion, that I wish to dis cuss in this book. And from the fact that so much difference of opinion exists about them it is natural to infer that they are questions about which it is extremely difficult to discover the truth. This is, I think, really the case...

ETHICS G. E. MOORE Lrrr. D., LL. D., F. B. A. HUMPHREY MILFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO First published in 1912 and reprinted in 1925 twice, 1927, 1928, 1930, 1936, 1939, 1944 and 1945 PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN CONTENTS OTAf. FA6P I UTILITARIANISM 7 U UTILITARIANISM concluded .... 40 ill THE OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS . 79 IV THH OBJECTIVITY oir MORAL JUDGMENTS concluded 138 V RESULTS THE TEST OF RIGHT AND WRONG . 170 VI FREE WILL 196 VII INTRINSIC VALUB .... 228 NOTE ON BOOKS 258 INDEX 266 ETHICS CHAPTER I UTILITARIANISM ETHICS is a subject about which there has been and still is an immense amount of difference of opinion, in spite of all the time and labour which have been devoted to the study of it. There are indeed certain matters about which there is not much disagree ment. Almost everybody is agreed that certain kinds of actions ought, as a general rule, to be avoided and that under certain circumstances, which constantly recur, it is, as a general rule, better to act in certain specified ways rather than in others. There is, moreover, a pretty general agreement, with regard to certain things which happen in the world, that it would be better if they never happened, or, at least, did not happen 8 ETHICS so often as they do and with regard to others, that it would be better if they hap pened more often than they do. But on many questions, even of this kind, there is great diversity of opinion. Actions which some philosophers hold to be generally wrong, others hold to be generally right, and occurrences which some hold to be evils, others hold to be goods. And when we come to more fundamental questions the difference of opinion is even more marked. Ethicalphilosophers have, in fact, been largely concerned, not with laying down rules to the effect that certain ways of acting are generally or always right, and others generally or always wrong, nor yet with giving lists of things which are good and others which are evil, but with trying to answer more general and fundamental questions such as the following. What, after all, is it that we mean to say of an action when we say that it is right or ought to be done And what is it that we mean to say of a state of things when we say that it is good or bad Can we discover any general characteristic, which belongs in UTILITARIANISM common to absolutely all right actions, no matter how different they may be in other respects and which does not belong to any actions except those which are right And can we similarly discover any char acteristic which belongs in common to absolutely all good things, and which does not belong to any thing except what is a good Or again, can we discover any single reason, applicable to all right actions equally, which is, in every case, the reason why an action is right, when it is right And can we, similarly, discover any reason which is the reason why a thing is good, when it is good, and which also gives us the reason why any one thing is better than another, when it is better Or is there, perhaps, no such single reason in either case On questions of this sort different philo sophers still hold the most diverse opinions. I think it is true that absolutely every answer which has ever been given to them by any one philosopher would be denied to be true by many others. There is, at any rate, no such consensus of opinion among experts about these fundamental ethical 10ETHICS questions, as there is about many funda mental propositions in Mathematics and the Natural Sciences. Now, it is precisely questions of this sort, about every one of which there are serious differences of opinion, that I wish to dis cuss in this book. And from the fact that so much difference of opinion exists about them it is natural to infer that they are questions about which it is extremely difficult to discover the truth. This is, I think, really the case...

G. E. Moore's 1912 work Ethics has tended to be overshadowed by his famous earlier work Principia Ethica. However, its detailed discussions of utilitarianism, free will, and the objectivity of moral judgements find no real counterpart in Principia, while its account of right and wrong and of the nature of intrinsic value deepen our understanding of Moore's moral philosophy. Moore himself regarded the book highly, writing late in his career, "I myself like [it] better than Principia Ethica, because it seems to me to be much clearer and far less full of confusions and invalid arguments." Short but philosophically rich, and written with impressive precision and intellectual candor, Ethics is a minor classic which repays careful study. This new edition includes Moore's essay "The Nature of Moral Philosophy" as well as editorial notes, an introduction, and a guide to further reading.

This collection chronicles the fiction and non fiction classics by the greatest writers the world has ever known. The inclusion of both popular as well as overlooked pieces is pivotal to providing a broad and representative collection of classic works.

G. E. Moore was a central figure in twentieth-century philosophy. Along with Russell and Wittgenstein, he pioneered analytic philosophy, and his Principia Ethica shaped the contours of twentieth-century ethics. Indeed, until the publication of Rawls's A Theory of Justice, no single book in moral philosophy was to equal Principia's influence. Unfortunately, however, Principia Ethica has so dominated critical discussions of Moore's work that even experts on his moral philosophy have tended to ignore his Ethics, which he published eight years later. But Ethics is Moore's only other book on moral philosophy, and one of only a handful of post-Principia publications dealing with ethics. Its detailed discussions of utilitarianism, free will, and the objectivity of moral judgements find no real counterpart in Principia while its account of right and wrong and of the nature of intrinsic value deepen our understanding of his moral philosophy. The republication of Ethics thus rounds out our understanding of Moore's ethical thought. But the book's value goes beyond its historical or scholarly interest. A short but philosophically rich text, Ethics stands independent of Principia and repays careful study in its own right. By raising a number of fundamental questions in ethics, questions that remain live today, by proffering clear, credible, and often innovative answers to them, and by doing so with a philosophical skill that is still impressive, Moore's short book is a minor classic. Almost a century after its original publication, it still amply rewards those who read it. This new edition of Moore's Ethics includes his essay 'The Nature of Moral Philosophy' as well as editorial notes, an introduction, and a guide to further reading.